Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition - Jost,
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Psychological Bulletin
Copyright 2003 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
2003, Vol. 129, No. 3, 339 –375
0033-2909/03/$12.00
DOI: 10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.339
Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition
John T. Jost
Stanford University
Jack Glaser
University of California, Berkeley
Arie W. Kruglanski
University of Maryland at College Park
Frank J. Sulloway
University of California, Berkeley
Analyzing political conservatism as motivated social cognition integrates theories of personality (au-
thoritarianism, dogmatism–intolerance of ambiguity), epistemic and existential needs (for closure,
regulatory focus, terror management), and ideological rationalization (social dominance, system justifi-
cation). A meta-analysis (88 samples, 12 countries, 22,818 cases) confirms that several psychological
variables predict political conservatism: death anxiety (weighted mean
r
.50); system instability (.47);
dogmatism–intolerance of ambiguity (.34); openness to experience (–.32); uncertainty tolerance (–.27);
needs for order, structure, and closure (.26); integrative complexity (–.20); fear of threat and loss (.18);
and self-esteem (–.09). The core ideology of conservatism stresses resistance to change and justification
of inequality and is motivated by needs that vary situationally and dispositionally to manage uncertainty
and threat.
Conservatism is a demanding mistress and is giving me a migraine.
—George F. Will,
Bunts
Rokeach, 1960; Shils, 1954), but it has withstood the relentless
tests of time and empirical scrutiny (e.g., Altemeyer, 1981, 1988,
1996, 1998; Billig, 1984; Brown, 1965; Christie, 1991; Elms,
1969; Sidanius, 1985; W. F. Stone, 1980; W. F. Stone, Lederer, &
Christie, 1993; Tetlock, 1984; Wilson, 1973c). A voluminous
literature, which we review here, facilitates the comparison of
cognitive styles and motivational needs of political conservatives
with those of moderates, liberals, radicals, and left-wingers. In
addition to classic and contemporary approaches to authoritarian-
ism, we cover less obvious sources of theory and research on
individual differences associated with dogmatism and intolerance
of ambiguity, uncertainty avoidance, need for cognitive closure,
and social dominance orientation (SDO) insofar as each of these
psychological variables contributes to a deeper and more nuanced
understanding of political conservatism.
The study of authoritarianism and other personality theories of
political attitudes is often dismissed a priori as an illegitimate,
value-laden attempt to correlate general psychological profiles
with specific ideological beliefs (e.g., Durrheim, 1997; J. L. Mar-
tin, 2001; Ray, 1988). The psychological study of ideological
conservatism is one that invites controversy (e.g., Redding, 2001;
Sears, 1994; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996; Sniderman & Tet-
lock, 1986; Tetlock, 1994; Tetlock & Mitchell, 1993), but this
circumstance does not mean that researchers should avoid it. Our
view is that it is a legitimate empirical issue whether there are
demonstrable links between a clearly defined set of psychological
needs, motives, and properties and the adoption of politically
conservative attitudes. The measurement of individual differences
is an excellent starting point for understanding the psychological
basis of political ideology, but we argue that approaching political
conservatism exclusively from the standpoint of personality theory
is a mistake. The hypothesis that people adopt conservative ide-
ologies in an effort to satisfy various social– cognitive motives
requires a novel theoretical perspective that overcomes two crucial
limitations
For more than half a century, psychologists have been tracking
the hypothesis that different psychological motives and tendencies
underlie ideological differences between the political left and the
right. The practice of singling out political conservatives for spe-
cial study began with Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and
Sanford’s (1950) landmark study of authoritarianism and the fas-
cist potential in personality. An asymmetrical focus on right-wing
authoritarianism (RWA) was criticized heavily on theoretical and
methodological grounds (e.g., Christie, 1954; Eysenck, 1954;
John T. Jost, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University; Jack
Glaser, Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California, Berke-
ley; Arie W. Kruglanski, Department of Psychology, University of Mary-
land at College Park; Frank J. Sulloway, Institute of Personality and Social
Research, University of California, Berkeley.
This work first began while John T. Jost was a postdoctoral fellow at the
University of Maryland at College Park, supported by National Institute of
Mental Health Grant R01-MH52578, National Science Foundation Grant
SBR-9417422, and a Research Scientist Award KO5-MHO 1213 to Arie
W. Kruglanski. Work continued while Jack Glaser was a postdoctoral
fellow at the Institute of Personality and Social Research at the University
of California, Berkeley and sponsored by National Institute of Mental
Health Grant F32-MH12195 and while Arie W. Kruglanski (supported by
National Science Foundation Grant SBR-9022192) and Frank J. Sulloway
were fellows at the Center for Advanced Studies of Behavioral Sciences at
Stanford University. Further financial and administrative support for this
project was provided by the Graduate School of Business at Stanford
University and the Jackson Library Document Delivery Service.
We are grateful for exceedingly helpful comments on previous versions
of this article by Jeff Greenberg, E. Tory Higgins, Orsolya Hunyady, and
Jim Sidanius. We also wish to thank Robert Rosenthal for statistical advice.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to John T.
Jost, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, Califor-
nia 94305. E-mail: jost_john@gsb.stanford.edu
of
traditional
research
on
the
psychology
of
conservatism.
339
340
JOST, GLASER, KRUGLANSKI, AND SULLOWAY
First, too many measures of individual differences have con-
flated psychological and political variables in an attempt to mea-
sure a construct that is really a hybrid of the two. Wilson (1973c),
for instance, offered an amalgamated definition of conservatism as
“resistance to change and the tendency to prefer safe, traditional
and conventional forms of institutions and behaviour” (p. 4).
However, Wilson and Patterson’s (1968) Conservatism Scale (C-
Scale)—which is the psychological instrument that has been most
widely used to measure conservatism— combines nonpolitical
stimuli that are meant to elicit general attitudes concerning uncer-
tainty avoidance (e.g., modern art, jazz music, horoscopes) and
stimuli that have explicitly political referents (e.g., death penalty,
legalized abortion, socialism, religion). The fact that such a seem-
ingly heterogeneous scale would exhibit reasonable psychometric
properties with respect to reliability and validity suggests that
Wilson and his colleagues were accurately perceiving a link be-
tween general epistemic motivations and conservative ideology
(see also Bagley, Wilson, & Boshier, 1970; Wilson, 1973a). Nev-
ertheless, theoretical and empirical efforts are generally hampered
by the failure to distinguish clearly between psychological and
ideological variables (Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986).
Second, treating political conservatism solely as an individual-
difference variable neglects growing evidence that situational fac-
tors influence the experience and expression of conservatism (e.g.,
Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Greenberg et al., 1990; Jost, Kruglanski,
& Simon, 1999; Kruglanski & Webster, 1991; Sales & Friend,
1973; Sulloway, 1996, 2001). If classic personality theories are
correct in positing that character rigidity and motivational threat
are related to the holding of conservative attitudes, then system
instability and other threatening circumstances should also in-
crease conservative tendencies in the population as a whole (e.g.,
Fromm, 1941; McCann, 1997; Reich, 1946/1970; Sales, 1972,
1973; Sanford, 1966). In an effort to stimulate innovative ap-
proaches to the study of situations as well as dispositions that
foster ideological conservatism, we cast a wide net in reviewing
theories of motivated social cognition that are not conventionally
regarded as political in nature, including theories of lay epistemics,
regulatory focus, and terror management. Thus, we argue that
tendencies toward political conservatism are influenced by a mul-
tiplicity of social– cognitive motives.
ical motives and political outcomes and helps to explain relations
between the two; (c) highlights situational as well as dispositional
variables that relate to conservatism; (d) takes into account a wider
variety of epistemic, existential, and ideologically defensive mo-
tivations than has been considered previously; and (e) provides an
integrative framework for understanding how these motives work
together to reduce and manage fear and uncertainty.
The Motivated Social–Cognitive Perspective
To set the stage, we use the term
motivated social cognition
to
refer to a number of assumptions about the relationship between
people’s beliefs and their motivational underpinnings (e.g.,
Bruner, 1957; Duckitt, 2001; Dunning, 1999; Fiske & Taylor,
1991; Greenwald, 1980; Hastorf & Cantril, 1954; Higgins, 1998;
Kruglanski, 1996; Kunda, 1990; Rokeach, 1960). In the post-
Freudian world, the ancient dichotomy between reason and passion
is blurred, and nearly everyone is aware of the possibility that
people are capable of believing what they want to believe, at least
within certain limits. Our first assumption, too, is that conservative
ideologies—like virtually all other belief systems—are adopted in
part because they satisfy some psychological needs. This does not
mean that conservatism is pathological or that conservative beliefs
are necessarily false, irrational, or unprincipled. From the present
perspective, most human beliefs are subjectively rational in the
sense of being deduced from a set of premises to which believers
subscribe (Kruglanski, 1999; Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999a,
1999b), and they are also at least partially responsive to reality
constraints (Kunda, 1990). In this sense, any given person’s con-
servatism may well be principled in that it is related logically or
psychologically to other observations, values, beliefs, and pre-
mises. At the same time, adherence to principles and syllogistic
reasoning do not occur in a motivational vacuum but rather in the
context of a variety of virtually inescapable personal and social
motivations (e.g., Hastorf & Cantril, 1954; Kunda, 1990; Lord,
Ross, & Lepper, 1979) that are not necessarily consciously acces-
sible (e.g., Kruglanski, 1996, 1999). Thus, political attitudes may
well be principled (e.g., Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock, & Kendrick,
1991; Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986) and motivationally fueled at
the same time.
Overview
General Theoretical Assumptions
We propose that a motivated social– cognitive approach offers
the greatest potential for unifying relatively diverse theories and
findings related to the psychological basis of political conserva-
tism—that is, theories and findings that link social and cognitive
motives to the contents of specific political attitudes. Specifically,
we distill key insights from theories of personality and individual
differences, theories of epistemic and existential needs, and socio-
political theories of ideology as individual and collective rational-
izations. Following this eclectic review of theoretical perspectives,
we examine the balance of evidence for and against several vari-
ants of the hypothesis that people embrace political conservatism
(at least in part) because it serves to reduce fear, anxiety, and
uncertainty; to avoid change, disruption, and ambiguity; and to
explain, order, and justify inequality among groups and individu-
als. Treating political conservatism as a special case of motivated
social cognition (a) goes beyond traditional individual-difference
approaches; (b) maintains a clear distinction between psycholog-
We find it useful to distinguish between
directional
and
nondi-
rectional motives
involved in belief formation. Directional motives
reflect the desire to reach a specific conclusion, such as that the
self is worthy or valuable (e.g., Dunning, 1999; Greenwald, 1980;
Kunda, 1990), that Republican leaders are benevolent and moral
(e.g., Lind, 1996), that the economy will improve, or that one’s
position of privilege will be preserved (Sears & Funk, 1991;
Sidanius, 1984). By contrast, nondirectional motives, such as the
“need to know” (Rokeach, 1960), the need for nonspecific closure
(Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), the fear of invalidity (Kruglanski
& Freund, 1983), and the need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty,
1982) reflect the desire to arrive at a belief or understanding,
independent of its content. Both directional and nondirectional
motives are assumed to affect belief formation by determining the
extent of information processing (Ditto & Lopez, 1992), bringing
about selective exposure to information (Frey, 1986) and affecting
other modes of processing available information (Kruglanski,
CONSERVATISM AS MOTIVATED SOCIAL COGNITION
341
1996). The possibility that we consider in this article is that a kind
of matching process takes place whereby people adopt ideological
belief systems (such as conservatism, RWA, and SDO) that are
most likely to satisfy their psychological needs and motives (such
as needs for order, structure, and closure and the avoidance of
uncertainty or threat).
1
A theoretical assumption we make is that the same motives may
underlie different beliefs and that different motives may underlie
the same belief. The need for self-enhancement, for example,
could lead one to praise or to criticize another person, by preserv-
ing a concept of self that is either generous or superior, respec-
tively. Similarly, the belief that a friend, spouse, or family member
is praiseworthy could arise not only from self-enhancement but
also from needs for impression management, cognitive consis-
tency, and accuracy. In the context of political conservatism, this
means that (a) a temporary motive (such as the need for cognitive
closure or prevention focus or terror management) could lead one
to express liberal as well as conservative beliefs, depending on
one’s chronically accessible ideology (Greenberg, Simon, Pyszc-
zynski, Solomon, & Chatel, 1992; Jost et al., 1999; Liberman,
Idson, Camacho, & Higgins, 1999), and (b) some people might
adopt conservative beliefs out of a desire for certainty, whereas
others adopt the same beliefs because of a threat to self-esteem or
an ideological threat to the system.
From our theoretical perspective, motivational and informa-
tional influences on belief formation are not at all incompatible.
On the contrary, in most cases they are both necessary, and they
work together in any instance of belief formation, although their
functions in the belief formation process are very different. Infor-
mation serves as evidence that provides the basis for forming
beliefs at either a conscious or unconscious level. Some of this
evidence is derived from source expertise (Kruglanski & Thomp-
son, 1999a, 1999b; McGuire, 1985) and “referent informational
influence” (Turner, 1991), and these factors help to explain why
parents and other authority figures are effective at socializing
children to hold specific political beliefs (e.g., Altemeyer, 1981,
1988, 1996; Rohan & Zanna, 1998; Sears, 1983). Other informa-
tion is contained in messages (or arguments) rather than sources
(Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999b), and this information may be
more readily assimilated when it is perceived as providing support
for prior beliefs (e.g., Hastorf & Cantril, 1954; Lord et al., 1979).
Thus, information often plays a rationalizing or legitimizing role in
the construction and preservation of ideological belief systems.
Whether specific beliefs may be considered objectively true or
false has little (or nothing) to do with the subjective reasons for
believing. Arriving at desired conclusions may be considered
epistemologically valid only if the evidence supports those con-
clusions. Motives to maintain security or resolve uncertainty or to
avoid threat or prevent negative outcomes might lead one to adopt
beliefs that are, for example, socially or economically conserva-
tive, but the degree to which these beliefs are rational or correct
must be assessed independently of the motivations that drive them
(Kruglanski, 1989). Thus, it does not follow from our motivated
social– cognitive analysis that politically conservative beliefs (or
any other beliefs) are false simply because they are motivated by
epistemic, existential, and ideological concerns.
A motivated social– cognitive approach is one that emphasizes
the interface between cognitive and motivational properties of the
individual as they impact fundamental social psychological phe-
nomena (e.g., Bruner, 1957; Dunning, 1999; Fiske & Taylor, 1991;
Greenwald, 1980; Higgins, 1998; Kruglanski, 1996; Kunda, 1990).
It may be distinguished from several other psychological ap-
proaches. For instance, our approach departs from the assumptions
of “cold cognitive” approaches to attitudes and social judgment,
which discount motivational constructs as explanations, favoring
instead information-processing limitations and mechanisms as de-
terminants of social judgments (e.g., Hamilton & Rose, 1980;
D. T. Miller & Ross, 1975; Srull & Wyer, 1979). “Hot cognitive”
approaches highlight the pervasive role that affect and motivation
play in attention, memory, judgment, decision making, and human
reasoning, as well as highlighting the cognitive, goal-directed
aspects of most motivational phenomena (e.g., Bargh & Gollwit-
zer, 1994; Kruglanski, 1996). Ideology is perhaps the quintessen-
tial example of hot cognition, in that people are highly motivated
to perceive the world in ways that satisfy their needs, values, and
prior epistemic commitments (Abelson, 1995).
Distinguishing Motivated Social Cognition From Other
Theories of Conservatism
With regard to other theories of conservatism, a motivated
social– cognitive perspective may be distinguished from (a) a
stable individual-differences approach; (b) a pure instrumental or
self-interest theory of conservatism; and (c) theories of modeling,
imitation, or simple reinforcement. Although we suggest in this
review that there may be individual differences associated with
political conservatism (such as authoritarianism, intolerance of
ambiguity, need for cognitive closure), we also argue that there
should be considerable situational variation in expressions of con-
servative tendencies. Thus, we are influenced by personality the-
ories of conservatism, but we find them most useful for identifying
needs and motivations that may be temporarily as well as chron-
ically accessible. This opens the door to situationalist, social
psychological theorizing and research on the manifestations of
political conservatism.
Past research and theory on conservatism in sociology, econom-
ics, and political science has often assumed that people adopt
conservative ideologies out of self-interest (see Sears & Funk,
1991). This account fits well with data indicating increased con-
servatism among upper-class elites (e.g., Centers, 1949; Sidanius
& Ekehammar, 1979). Although we grant that self-interest is one
among many motives that are capable of influencing political
attitudes and behavior, our review requires a reexamination of this
issue. Specifically, many of the theories we integrate suggest that
1
Rokeach (1960) advanced a similar argument concerning the match
between cognitive structure and ideological content:
We thus see in the case of fascism that ideological content and
structure support each other. There is no incompatibility between
them and thus psychological conflict is not engendered or guilt
feelings aroused. For this reason, authoritarian ideological structures
may be psychologically more reconcilable—more easily “attach-
able”—to ideologies that are antidemocratic than to those that are
democratic in content. If a person’s underlying motivations are served
by forming a closed belief system, then it is more than likely that his
motivations can also be served by embracing an ideology that is
blatantly anti-equalitarian. If this is so, it would account for the
somewhat greater affinity we have observed between authoritarian
belief structure and conservatism than between the same belief struc-
ture and liberalism. (p. 127)
342
JOST, GLASER, KRUGLANSKI, AND SULLOWAY
motives to overcome fear, threat, and uncertainty may be associ-
ated with increased conservatism, and some of these motives
should be more pronounced among members of disadvantaged and
low-status groups. As a result, the disadvantaged might embrace
right-wing ideologies under some circumstances to reduce fear,
anxiety, dissonance, uncertainty, or instability (e.g., Jost, Pelham,
Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003; Lane, 1962; Nias, 1973), whereas the
advantaged might gravitate toward conservatism for reasons of
self-interest or social dominance (e.g., Centers, 1949; Sidanius &
Ekehammar, 1979; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).
A motivated–social cognitive perspective also defies relatively
straightforward theories of imitation and social learning, which
assume that people are conservative because their parents (or other
agents of influence) modeled conservative attitudes or behaviors.
Correlations between the political attitudes of parents and their
offspring generally attain statistical significance, but they leave the
majority of variance unexplained (e.g., Altemeyer, 1988; Sears,
1983; Sidanius & Ekehammar, 1979; Sulloway, 1996). We do not
deny that personality goals, rational self-interest, and social learn-
ing are important factors that drive conservatism, but our perspec-
tive stresses that politically conservative orientations are multiply
determined by a wide variety of factors that vary personally and
situationally. We argue that conservatism as a belief system is a
function of many different kinds of variables, but that a matching
relationship holds between certain kinds of psychological motives
and specific ideological outcomes. Thus, the general assumptions
of our motivated social– cognitive perspective may be applied
usefully to the analysis of any coherent belief system (irrespective
of content), but the specific array of epistemic, existential, and
ideological motives that we review in this article uniquely char-
acterizes political conservatism as a system of interrelated beliefs.
(Morris, 1976, p. 312). Traditionalism and hostility to social in-
novation were central to Mannheim’s (1927/1986) sociological
analysis of conservatism. Rossiter (1968), too, defined
situational
conservatism
in the
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sci-
ences
as “an attitude of opposition to disruptive change in the
social, economic, legal, religious, political, or cultural order” (p.
291).
3
He added, “The distinguishing mark of this conservatism, as
indeed it is of any brand of conservatism, is the
fear of change
[italics added], which becomes transformed in the political arena
into the fear of radicalism” (p. 291). Consistent with this notion,
Conover and Feldman (1981) found that the primary basis for
self-definitions of liberals and conservatives has to do with accep-
tance of, versus resistance to, change (see also Huntington, 1957).
This dimension of conservatism is captured especially well by
Wilson and Patterson’s (1968) C-Scale and by Altemeyer’s (1996,
1998) RWA Scale.
A second core issue concerns preferences for inequality. As
Giddens (1998), following Bobbio (1996), wrote, “One major
criterion continually reappears in distinguishing left from right:
attitudes toward equality
[italics added]. The left favours greater
equality, while the right sees society as inevitably hierarchical” (p.
40). This characterization is consistent with many historical and
political definitions of conservative and right-wing ideology (Mul-
ler, 2001), and it is also reflected in several scales used to measure
conservatism (Knight, 1999). Specifically, measures of political–
economic conservatism (Sidanius & Ekehammar, 1979), SDO
(Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), and economic sys-
tem justification (Jost & Thompson, 2000) all focus on attitudes
toward equality.
Relations between resistance to change and acceptance of in-
equality.
Although we believe that the two core dimensions of
political conservatism—resistance to change and acceptance of
inequality—are often related to one another, they are obviously
distinguishable. Vivid counterexamples come to mind in which the
two dimensions are negatively related to one another. For instance,
there is the “conservative paradox” of right-wing revolutionaries,
such as Hitler or Mussolini or Pinochet, who seem to advocate
The Ideology of Conservatism
The ideology of conservatism has long served as subject matter
for historians (e.g., Diamond, 1995; Kolko, 1963), journalists (e.g.,
Lind, 1996; I. F. Stone, 1989), political scientists (e.g., Carmines
& Berkman, 1994; Conover & Feldman, 1981; Huntington, 1957;
McClosky & Zaller, 1984), sociologists (e.g., Anderson, Zelditch,
Takagi, & Whiteside, 1965; Danigelis & Cutler, 1991; Lo &
Schwartz, 1998; Mannheim, 1927/1986, 1936; A. S. Miller, 1994),
and philosophers (e.g., Eagleton, 1991; Habermas, 1989; Rorty,
1989). Our goal in the present article is to summon the unique
analytical powers drawn from a variety of psychological theories
of motivated social cognition to shed light on the anatomy of
conservatism. Following Abric (2001), we argue that political
conservatism, like many other complex social representations, has
both a stable definitional
core
and a set of more malleable, his-
torically changing
peripheral
associations (what Huntington,
1957, referred to as
secondary issues
). It is the ideological core of
political conservatism (more than its peripheral aspects) that we
hypothesize to be linked to specific social, cognitive, and motiva-
tional needs.
2
2
Social scientists have debated for years whether political ideology
exists at all as a coherent, internally consistent system of beliefs in the
minds of individuals (e.g., Converse, 1964; Judd, Krosnick, & Milburn,
1981; Kerlinger, 1984; McGuire, 1985). Granting that ideologies—like
other attitudes—possess a high degree of malleability, we argue that it is
still worthwhile to consider the psychological characteristics of conserva-
tive thought. Specifically, we propose that one might distinguish between
a relatively stable ideological core of conservatism comprised of resistance
to change and acceptance of inequality (e.g., Giddens, 1998; Huntington,
1957; Mannheim, 1927/1986; Rossiter, 1968) and more ideologically pe-
ripheral issues (such as school busing or gun control) that are likely to vary
considerably in their ideological relevance across time. Because the con-
servative core may be grounded in powerful and relatively stable individual
needs, it may persist as a deep personality structure, the surface manifes-
tations of which might change with the tides of social and political debate.
3
In the most recent edition of the
International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences
, Muller’s (2001) definition of conservatism similarly
stresses resistance to change (as well as belief in the legitimacy of inequal-
ity). He observed: “For conservatives, the historical survival of an institu-
tion or practice— be it marriage, monarchy, or the market— creates a
prima
facie
case that it has served some need” (p. 2625). That is, what conser-
vatives share is a tendency to rationalize existing institutions, especially
those that maintain hierarchical authority.
Conceptual Definitions
Core aspects of conservative ideology.
Dictionary definitions
of conservatism stress “the disposition and tendency to preserve
what is established; opposition to change” (Neilson, 1958, p. 568)
and “the disposition in politics to maintain the existing order”
CONSERVATISM AS MOTIVATED SOCIAL COGNITION
343
social change in the direction of decreased egalitarianism. In at
least some of these cases, what appears to be a desire for change
is really “an imaginatively transfigured conception of the past with
which to criticize the present” (Muller, 2001, p. 2625). There are
also cases of left-wing ideologues who, once they are in power,
steadfastly resist change, allegedly in the name of egalitarianism,
such as Stalin or Khrushchev or Castro (see J. Martin, Scully, &
Levitt, 1990). It is reasonable to suggest that some of these
historical figures may be considered politically conservative, at
least in the context of the systems they defended.
4
In any case, we are not denying that liberals can be rigid
defenders of the status quo or that conservatives can support
change. We assume that historical and cultural variation in polit-
ical systems affects both the meaning of conservatism and the
strength of empirical associations between the psychological and
ideological variables we investigate. To take one fairly obvious
example, it seems likely that many left-wingers in totalitarian
communist regimes would exhibit mental rigidity and other psy-
chological characteristics that are often thought to be associated
with right-wingers in other contexts. To be sure, social scientists in
the West have undersampled these populations in developing and
assessing their theories.
Despite dramatic exceptions, the two core aspects of conserva-
tism are generally psychologically related to one another for most
of the people most of the time (Muller, 2001). In part, this is
because of the historical fact that traditional social arrangements
have generally been more hierarchical and less egalitarian com-
pared with nontraditional arrangements. Therefore, to resist
change in general has often meant resisting increased efforts at
egalitarianism; conversely, to preserve the status quo has typically
entailed entrusting the present and future to the same authorities
who have controlled the past. Accordingly, several common mea-
sures of political conservatism include items gauging both resis-
tance to change and endorsement of inequality (see Knight, 1999;
Sidanius, 1978, 1985; Wilson, 1973c). As most Western societies
have passed through the various major revolutions and reform
movements that have characterized the period since the Middle
Ages, the strength of the connection between resistance to change
and opposition to equality has weakened (see also Sulloway,
1996). In a hypothetical world of complete equality, it is quite
plausible that the two dimensions would be uncorrelated and that
conservatives would fear changes that would reduce equality.
These observations underscore the importance of investigating
our hypotheses in as many different national and cultural contexts
as possible, including cultures in which the status quo is relatively
egalitarian and/or left-wing. Examples involving socialist or com-
munist countries make clear that resistance to change and anti-
egalitarianism are independent constructs in principle, even if they
tend to be (imperfectly) correlated in most cases. Such political
contexts offer the best opportunities to determine whether our
specific epistemic, existential, and ideological motives are associ-
ated with allegiance to the status quo (whether left-wing or right-
wing) or whether they are associated with right-wing attitudes in
particular. Unfortunately, little or no empirical data are available
from the major communist or formerly communist countries such
as China, Russia, and Cuba. Nevertheless, we have made a special
effort to seek out and incorporate results obtained in 12 different
countries, including those with historical influences of socialism or
communism, including Sweden (Sidanius, 1978, 1985), Poland
(Golec, 2001), East Germany (Fay & Frese, 2000), West Germany
(Kemmelmeier, 1997), Italy (Chirumbolo, 2002), England (Kirton,
1978; Kohn, 1974; Nias, 1973; Rokeach, 1960; Smithers & Lob-
ley, 1978; Tetlock, 1984), Canada (Altemeyer, 1998), and Israel
(Fibert & Ressler, 1998; Florian, Mikulincer, & Hirschberger,
2001). As we reveal below, the empirical results from these
countries are not generally different from those obtained in other
national contexts.
Peripheral aspects of conservative ideology.
Historically, con-
servatism as an ideological belief system has embodied many
things, including the desire for order and stability, preference for
gradual rather than revolutionary change (if any), adherence to
preexisting social norms, idealization of authority figures, punish-
ment of deviants, and endorsement of social and economic in-
equality (e.g., Eckhardt, 1991; Eysenck & Wilson, 1978; Ker-
linger, 1984; Lentz, 1939; Mannheim, 1927/1986; McClosky &
Zaller, 1984; Sidanius et al., 1996; W. F. Stone & Schaffner, 1988;
Tomkins, 1963; Wilson, 1973c). Some of these preferences are
directly related to the core aspects of ideology, whereas others are
not. The fact that conservatism stands for so many different goals
and affects so many areas of life means that people who are
motivated to uphold conservative ideals are sometimes faced with
perplexing dilemmas. The degree of complexity involved in the
ideological label of conservatism not only gives George F. Will
(1998) a migraine from time to time, as the opening quotation of
this article suggests, but it also makes the concept of conservatism
a particularly difficult one to define and to study with the methods
of social science (Muller, 2001). Matters are made even more
complicated by the fact that historical and cultural factors change
the manifestations of conservatism. For instance, conservatism in
the United States during the 1960s entailed support for the Viet-
nam War and opposition to civil rights, whereas conservatism in
the 1990s had more to do with being tough on crime and support-
ing traditional moral and religious values (A. S. Miller, 1994). In
post-fascist Europe, conservatives have emphasized their opposi-
tion to communism, economic redistribution, and the growth of the
welfare state (Muller, 2001). But even in the context of historical
and cultural variation, there is some utility in identifying major
social and psychological factors that are associated with core
values of ideological conservatism, as Mannheim (1927/1986) and
many others have argued.
5
4
The clearest example seems to be Stalin, who secretly admired Hitler
and identified with several right-wing causes (including anti-Semitism). In
the Soviet context, Stalin was almost certainly to the right of his political
rivals, most notably Trotsky. In terms of his psychological makeup as well,
Stalin appears to have had much in common with right-wing extremists
(see, e.g., Birt, 1993; Bullock, 1993; Robins & Post, 1997).
5
Our motivated social– cognitive perspective also recognizes that people
might occasionally adopt conservative ideologies for reasons having little
if anything to do with either acceptance of change or support for inequality.
For instance, they may be motivated by (conscious or unconscious) at-
tempts to secure the approval of conservative parents, acceptance by
conservative peers, or the trust of conservative superiors. In addition,
people may be drawn (e.g., by perceived self-interest) to accept peripheral
elements of a conservative ideology (e.g., related to such issues as racial
integration, school busing, or taxation) and eventually accept other ele-
ments of the ideology because of their association with likeminded others
who share their position on local issues and also endorse core conservative
positions (related to resistance to change and acceptance of inequality).
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