Polish hard power Investing in the military as Europe cuts back,
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12.01.2014
Polish hard power: Investing in the military as Europe cuts back - Foreign and Defense Policy - AEI
Polish hard power: Investing in the
military as Europe cuts back
Andrew A. Michta|
American Enterprise InstituteDecember 19, 2013
Reuters
The Polish tank PT-91, a newer model of the Soviet tank T-72, drives through water at the military base in Bedrusko near Poznan,
western Poland, July 9, 2013.
Article
Highlights
The following National Security Outlook is
the eighth in AEI’s Hard Power series—a
project of the Marilyn Ware Center for
Security Studies that examines the state of
the defense capabilities of America’s allies
and security partners.[
1
] In it, Andrew
Michta outlines the case of Poland, which
he notes is determined both to expand its
indigenous defense industrial capabilities
and to increase overall defense spending.
As numerous accounts of NATO defense
trends over the past two decades elucidate,
Poland’s decision to increase defense
spending is far more the exception than the
rule when it comes to America’s other major
allies. This is largely driven, according to
Michta, by Poland’s desire to fend as much as it can for itself in light of what
it sees as Russian revanchism and Washington’s growing disengagement
from Europe in defense matters. Not surprisingly, this has led to a shift in
Warsaw’s security agenda since Poland joined NATO in 1999. Despite
Poland being one NATO ally that has responded positively to Washington’s
calls for increasing defense capacities, today Warsaw increasingly feels
compelled to look to its own resources and to neighboring capitals as
potential security partners. Whether this drift in transatlantic ties is
permanent or inevitable remains an open question, and will to a large extent
depend on how US security relations with Europe develop in the coming
years.
As Poland
undertakes its
military
modernization effort,
defense officials are
pushing for the
maximum
participation of
Polish firms.
Tweet ThisPoland's current
military
modernization plan
calls for spending
PLN 91.5 billion
through 2022 and
stipulates spending
PLN 16 billion
through 2016.
Tweet ThisWarsaw's
preoccupation with
resurgent Russian
power is one of the
key variables
defining Poland's
current and future
security concerns.
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Email:
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—Gary Schmitt, Director, Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at AEI
Key points in this
Outlook:
Unlike America’s other major European allies, Poland’s growing economy
has allowed it to increase its defense spending.
Warsaw’s strategic focus has increasingly turned to improving Poland’s
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Polish hard power: Investing in the military as Europe cuts back - Foreign and Defense Policy - AEI
territorial defenses and working with neighboring allies to bolster regional
security.
Poland has begun a major military modernization program whose success
will depend on the continued health of the Polish economy and the
transformation of the Polish defense industry into an efficient producer of
advanced military equipment.
Poland’s security strategy rests on the twin pillars of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). As the American
military presence in Europe continues to shrink, however, Poland’s support
for the EU has increased, benefitting from EU structural-fund transfers,
expanded trade, and integration under the Schengen Agreement.
Consequently, while NATO and the United States remain essential to
Poland’s security, today Germany is Poland’s key ally on the Continent, with
Polish public opinion showing for the first time in a 2012 survey a preference
for Germany over the United States.[
2
]
Though positive attitudes toward the United States rebounded somewhat a
year later, clearly the Polish public has become more distant in its view of
America. The Obama administration’s 2009 decision to cancel the George
W. Bush–era missile shield whose ground interceptors were to be based in
Poland was a shock to bilateral ties. Announced on the 70th anniversary of
the 1939 Soviet invasion of Poland, it became a public relations debacle for
Washington. Compounding problems is the administration’s more recent
decision to scrap its plans for deploying high-speed Standard Missile 3
Block IIB interceptors in Poland and Romania (Phase Four of the European
Phased Adaptive Approach) and Washington’s continued reluctance to lift
the visa requirement for Poles travelling to the United States. And while
there remains a large reservoir of public good will in Poland toward the
United States, with a large Polish American ethnic community and a history
of close military cooperation in recent years, these decisions have chipped
away at traditional pro-US sentiments in Poland.
Similarly, while Poland remains committed to
NATO as the military pillar of its national
security and, as such, a strong supporter of
NATO’s Article V tasks of collective defense,
it has also become more vocal in support of
the EU Common Security and Defense
Policy. And again, while the United States
remains Poland’s principal ally and the
country has been an active participant in
American-led operations—with the largest
being in Iraq and Afghanistan—there has
been a marked decline in public support for
current and future expeditionary missions,
as exemplified in Warsaw’s decision to not
join other NATO allies in Operation Unified
Protector, the 2011 Libyan military
campaign.
"As Poland
undertakes its
military
modernization
effort, defense
officals are
pushing for the
maximum
participation of
Polish firms."
Poland’s increased focus on Article V matters is tied largely to its growing
concern about the resurgence of Russia’s power and influence along
Poland’s eastern border. Since eastward NATO enlargement, especially to
Ukraine, has all but vanished from US and European security policy
agendas, Poland finds itself in a border-state position within the alliance.
Warsaw’s perception of a changing regional power balance has brought
about a new emphasis on the defense of national territory in Poland, making
Warsaw refocus its attention closer to home as it plans to adapt the armed
forces accordingly.
Over the past five years, Poland has focused more and more on its
indigenous national defense capabilities, with the government funneling
resources for military modernization. Because of its history of foreign
invasions, the country has a keen appreciation of the vital importance of a
strong military to the nation’s sovereignty and security. An old Polish saying
captures well the public mood on national defense: “If you can count,
ultimately count on yourself.”
Bucking European Trends
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Polish hard power: Investing in the military as Europe cuts back - Foreign and Defense Policy - AEI
Amidst the current protracted economic crisis in Europe and despite a 2013
slowdown in growth in Poland’s own economy, Poland remains one of the
EU’s most dynamic countries. Today, it is its ninth-biggest economy, having
increased by almost a fifth since 2009.[
3
] And because the government is
required under Polish law to spend 1.95 percent of its annual gross
domestic product (GDP) on defense, a growing economy has allowed
Warsaw to buck the general European trend of cutting national defense
budgets (see figure 1).
With increased resources, Poland’s ministry of defense has launched “The
Modernization Plan for the Armed Forces in the Years 2013–2022”—the
country’s most ambitious program to date, which will include new ships,
helicopters, tanks and armored personnel carriers, additional aircraft, and
most importantly, new air and missile defenses.[
4
] The antiballistic (ABM)
system is the most significant of Poland’s military modernization efforts in
terms of planned dedicated resources. The estimated cost of Poland’s ABM
program is set between $4 and $6 billion, making it the largest acquisition
program in the country’s history.
In mid-2013, however, with the economy slowing, Polish Prime Minister
Donald Tusk was forced to revise the government’s budget, resulting in a 10
percent cut to the defense budget.[
5
] Despite these reductions, Minister of
Defense Tomasz Siemoniak has emphasized that the country’s strategic
projects will be protected, announcing in late September 2013 that military
modernization will reach PLN 91.5 billion (approximately $30 billion) through
2022, covering 14 specific programs.
Consistent with Poland’s desire to develop its military capabilities, the Polish
government has renewed its focus on modernizing and expanding the
country’s indigenous defense industrial sector. In fall 2013, the government
began the process of consolidating Poland’s defense industry into a unified
Polish Defense Group [Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ)] with the
expectation that it would improve the sector’s efficiency and
competitiveness. The PGZ will combine the flagship Polish Defense Holding
[Polski Holding Obronny, formerly Bumar] with Huta Stalowa Wola, among
others. The effort has just begun, so it is too early to judge its ultimate
impact on the industry. But the decision indicates the seriousness of the
government’s commitment to modernizing the defense sector and to making
it more competitive in international markets.
The immediate question going forward will be whether the Polish military can
still leverage available resources and complete the key elements of the
modernization program despite the 10 percent budget decrease. And since
it is government policy that modernization be done through the Polish
defense industry whenever possible, there will be considerable focus on
whether those firms can in fact deliver the product the military needs, and
especially whether they can partner with foreign firms to leverage synergies
with the domestic sector. In short, will Poland manage to continue committing
enough resources to remain one of the few countries in Europe that is still
serious about military power, and thereby become a NATO ally with growing
capabilities and political clout?
Military Modernization Plans
Poland has doubled its defense spending over the past decade. Initially, the
government budgeted PLN 31.4 billion on defense (approximately $10
billion) for 2013. Even with the planned 10 percent reductions in the 2013
defense budget, there has been a significant infusion of resources into the
Polish armed forces.
The current military modernization plan calls for spending PLN 91.5 billion
through 2022 and stipulates that PLN 16 billion will be expended by 2016.
The government has also restated that maintaining 1.95 percent of GDP on
defense remains a priority.
As part of the modernization process, Poland will establish two new high-
level military commands starting January 1, 2014.[
6
] The goal is to create a
joint operational command by replacing the separate service commands,
converting them into departments, and turning the general staff into a
strategic planning and advisory command.
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Polish hard power: Investing in the military as Europe cuts back - Foreign and Defense Policy - AEI
The government also intends to maximize the use of the Polish defense
industry with “Polonization” of the defense modernization effort tied to
technology transfer from international partners as acquisition plans move
forward. In addition, the government plans to spend PLN 40 billion on
purchases not included in the 2014–22 operational plans. In total, Poland
plans to spend approximately PLN 139 billion ($46.3 billion) on equipment
modernization across the services, on added information technology
capabilities, and on increasing the overall combat readiness of the Polish
forces. In the process, Poland plans to build its modernization effort around
14 major programs.[
7
] Considering the scope of programs and resources
allocated, a significant challenge for the defense ministry will be to improve
the acquisition process to ensure platforms and equipment are fielded; in
previous years, the ministry has even returned funds to the state budget.
For 2013, the Polish ministry of defense planned to increase capital
expenditures to 26.2 percent of the budget—a 4.2 percent increase
compared to the previous three years (see figure 2).[
8
] The structure of the
current Polish defense budget reflects the ministry’s commitment to reverse
the current approximate one-to-three ratio of modern-to-legacy military
systems. Polish military equipment remains a mix of Soviet-era legacy
systems (sometimes adapted with Western equipment) and innovative
Polish designs developed in cooperation with Western firms.
For example, Polish land forces maintain 901 main battle tanks, of which
128 are the older-generation German Leopard 2A4s, 232 are PT-91
Twardys (a Polish modification of the Soviet T-72), and 541 are obsolete T-
72s of three different types. Likewise, Poland maintains a fleet of 1,784
armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFV), of which more than two-thirds are
legacy Soviet BMP-1s, but nearly 500 are the highly capable KTO Rosomak,
a Polish version of a Finnish AIFV that has been battlefield tested in
Afghanistan. To help address this problem, however, in November 2013
Poland signed an agreement to purchase from Germany an additional 105
Leopard 2A5s, plus 14 Leopard 2A4s and 200
support vehicles.[
9
]
Addressing deficiencies in air mobility also remains a priority, as Polish
military helicopters are currently a combination of Soviet-era systems and
the aging PZL Sokół platform and its derivatives. To do so, the army will be
seeking to acquire up to 70 new helicopters. The defense ministry also
plans to issue funds for new modular armored vehicles, unmanned aerial
vehicles (including armed drones), self-propelled howitzers, heavy mortars,
antitank missiles, and new communication equipment.
The Polish navy has 5 tactical submarines (4 German-built, 1960s-era
Kobben class and 1 Soviet-legacy Kilo), 2 principal surface combatants
(Oliver Hazard Perry–class frigates), a corvette (Polish-built ORP Kaszub
class), and a number of mine warfare, mine countermeasure, patrol,
amphibious, and support ships. The navy’s aviation element includes two
naval aviation bases, with equipment deployed in three locations. Two of
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those locations are home to air groups that include planes and helicopters
for transport, antisubmarine, and search-and-rescue operations. The navy’s
modernization program includes new patrol boats, minesweepers, coastal-
defense vessels, and possibly up to three submarines.[
10
]
Of the three major services, the Polish air force ranks as the most modern
among post-communist states of Central Europe, averaging 160–200 flying
hours per year (comparable to France’s and exceeding Germany’s). The air
force operates three squadrons of F-16C/Ds, two squadrons of MiG-
29A/UBs, and two squadrons of fighter/ground-attack Su-22M-4s. The
Sukhoi aircraft have been slated for removal from service, and Poland will
be looking to purchase additional Western planes or unmanned aerial
vehicles. Two air-force transport squadrons fly a combination of C-130E, C-
295M, and Polish PZL M-28 Bryza aircraft. The air force also operates two
squadrons of transport helicopters which, as noted above, are aging
platforms.
On balance, the most successful air-force program so far has been the
addition of F-16 jet fighters to its fleet of aircraft, accelerating the
modernization process and increasing NATO interoperability. A visible sign
of progress has been the opening of a US training facility in the central
Polish town of Łask for rotational exercises of US and NATO aircraft.
Air and missile defenses (AMD), however, remain Poland’s top defense
priority. A law Poland passed this year appears to guarantee stable funding
for the systems.[
11
] The program will combine a medium-range missile and
air defense system and a variety of shorter-range systems with plans to
expand the coverage for the country’s entire territory. The government will
allocate PLN 26.4 billion for AMD through 2022, with PLN 1.2 billion planned
for 2014–16.[
12
]
Overall, Poland’s shopping list is extensive; some would call it overly
ambitious. And while the air and missile defense budget seems protected, in
light of the slowing economy and this year’s reduction in planned defense
expenditures there is already talk of reducing the number of helicopters in
the initial order and of cuts in other procurement programs. Indeed, there
are also questions as to whether—even if all the acquisition programs were
fully funded—Poland’s defense ministry would be able to meet its acquisition
plans. Some analysts have pointed out that based on the current track
record of procurement, and especially the rate of contract fulfillment in
2012, Poland may again have a shortfall from the original spending plans.
[
13
]
Leveraging Defense for Industrial Capacity
The Polish government sees military modernization as a path to modernizing
the country’s defense industry. The increase in procurement funds has
attracted a lot of attention from US and European defense industries—
something the Polish government is determined to leverage for national
defense industry modernization. Until 2013, Poland spent between 15 to 22
percent of its defense budget on equipment modernization. Poland’s
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